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Introduction
Across East Africa’s vast rangelands, pastoralist livestock 
systems have been commercialising since the early 1900s. 
Commercialisation has varied widely within and between areas, 
but now includes substantial livestock exports, regional and 
cross-border trade, and supply to domestic markets. Pastoralists 
have been highly responsive to market demands and will adapt 
herd composition and other practices to benefit from market 
opportunities. Extensive trade networks can develop rapidly 
across countries, often based on informal connections and 
outside of policies and regulations. In the last 10 years alone, a 
substantial cross-border trade in camels from eastern Ethiopia 
into Sudan has evolved (Aklilu and Catley, 2011), as well as a 
massive trade of donkeys in Kenya to meet demands for skins in 
China (Maichomo et al., 2018).
In contrast to the clear long-term trends in commercialisation, 
policies and programmes have often positioned pastoralists as 
market averse and, in part, this view has been used to justify 
heavy investments in livestock marketing since the 1970s, 
especially market infrastructure. Yet, the repeated construction 
of new livestock markets and abattoirs rarely seems to alter 
underlying trends in commercialisation. Not only do evaluations 
of new markets and programmes show how benefits are 
skewed towards wealthier producers, but commercialisation is 
widely reported as a key driver of increasing socio-economic 
differentiation in pastoralist areas. While livestock trade and 
its benefits are evident for households with larger herds, a 
depletion of herds in recent decades has forced many others to 
the edges of pastoralism or out of pastoralism altogether. These 
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Trends, surges and impacts: Long-term trends in 
livestock commercialisation have been evident for decades, 
and pastoralists are responsive to market demands. 
Commercialisation can accelerate following development 
initiatives, such as improved roads or communication, but 
the benefits of improved market access are often captured 
by wealthier producers. In general, commercialisation is an 
important long-term driver of increasing socio-economic 
differentiation in pastoralist areas. 
 
Livestock sales vs. herd growth: In pastoralist systems, 
livestock, not cash, is the dominant form of financial 
capital. Poorer pastoralists aim to build herds to build 
savings, so logically minimise livestock sales. Herd growth 
often exceeds cash growth. Animals are only sold when 
items such as food (cereals), medicines, or school fees are 
needed. New livestock markets or higher livestock prices 
don’t lead to more sales by poorer herders; livestock market 
development – especially export market development – as 
a poverty reduction strategy is flawed.
Commercialisation is political: Infrastructure or other 
developments that relate directly or indirectly to livestock 
commercialisation are often framed by planners as 
apolitical; yet, in reality, issues affecting livestock and trade 
are highly politicised. For example:
 ● The political power of ethnic groups and clans is 
underpinned by wealth, and livestock represent this 
wealth. 
 ● Development is often uneven, with conscious or 
unconscious bias, leading to isolation of certain groups 
from new facilities, tensions, and conflict. Furthermore, 
the placement of new livestock markets can generate 
conflict, igniting struggles around anticipated benefits 
and claims to a rightful share of expected trade. 
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long-term trends are reflected in the presence of large-scale social 
protection programmes in pastoralist areas of Kenya and Ethiopia. 
These areas are characterised by regular transfers of cash or food to 
poorer households, while wealthier households supply substantial 
numbers of livestock to domestic and export markets. 
This policy brief examines some of the key features of pastoralism 
that affect how commercialisation evolves in pastoralist societies, 
and why poorer producers often benefit least from new market 
access. The policy brief draws on a substantial body of research 
and programme evaluations, and two new APRA research reports 
on pastoral livestock commercialisation in south-east Ethiopia 
(Gebresenbet, 2020) and northern Kenya (Roba, 2020).
Commercialisation over time and long-term impacts
Against the multitude of government policies and aid projects 
that call for a transformation of pastoralism – from subsistence to 
market-based systems – is a substantial body of literature showing 
that pastoralists have been responding to market opportunities 
for at least a century. The classic East Africa case is Somalia, which, 
in 1927, exported 1.8 million sheep and goats (Hunt, 1951). Despite 
repeated droughts, wars, and livestock trade bans, Somali livestock 
exports have consistently exceeded one million animals per year 
since records began, and have often exceeded three million animals. 
In 2018, Somaliland’s Berbera port exported 1.4 million animals, 
valued at approximately US$150 million (Somaliland Chamber of 
Commerce, Industry and Agriculture, 2018). 
Although less prominent than in Somali areas, commercialisation 
has been taking place across many pastoralist areas since at 
least the 1920s. Selling for the market was often associated with 
state expansion, road construction, the emergence of trading 
posts, and tax collection. However, while some livestock sales 
were an opportunistic response to market demands, other sales 
were a result of severe livelihood shocks and stresses caused by 
conflict, rinderpest outbreaks, and droughts (e.g., Galaty and 
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Figure 1. Trends in livestock ownership by wealth group over 60 years (1944–2004), Shinile Zone, Ethiopia
Source: Aklilu, Y. and Catley, A. (2011), reproduced by kind permission of Tufts University
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Bonte, 1991; Ensminger, 1996). Increasingly, pastoralists became 
more dependent on markets, and although sales or exchanges of 
livestock for cereals indicated livelihoods under pressure, these sales 
became normalised. 
In accounts of changing pastoral livelihoods in East Africa, 
commercialisation has been frequently emphasised as a driver 
of increasing wealth stratification, and economic analyses have 
explained why larger herds/households tend to displace smaller 
herds/households in a more commercial pastoral environment 
(e.g., Abdullahi, 1993). Not only do wealthier herd owners have 
more surplus animals to sell, over time they can also take control 
of hitherto communal resources for private use. Poorer herders are 
then excluded from critical dry season grazing areas or water points, 
or they pay for access. When droughts, conflict, population growth 
and other factors are superimposed on these trends, increasing 
commercialisation and increasing poverty co-exist. Notably, trends 
in poverty and declining per capita ownership of livestock are 
evident across diverse pastoralist areas of East Africa, with relatively 
small numbers of wealthier herders now owning most of the 
animals in the Afar and Somali regions of Ethiopia (Sabates-Wheeler 
and Lind, 2013), in Marsabit County in northern Kenya (Mburu et 
al., 2017), and Karamoja, Uganda (Catley and Ayele, 2018). In the 
Shinile Zone of Ethiopia, trends in livestock ownership by pastoralist 
wealth groups over 60 years are illustrated in Figure 1 and show the 
emergence of ‘very poor’ and ‘poor’ wealth groups with very low 
levels of livestock ownership.
Recent APRA research in South Omo, Ethiopia, clearly shows 
how different forms of state expansion affect pastoralist groups 
in terms of commercialisation and livestock sales (Gebresenbet, 
2020). In a remote area occupied by Bodi agro-pastoralists, there 
was very limited contact with the Ethiopian government and 
very few development initiatives until the mid-2000s, when 
construction of the massive Gibe III dam began, with related 
industrial sugar production. Not only did the Bodi lose land to the 
government’s Ethiopian Sugar Corporation, they were also subject 
to a government sedenterisation programme, which they resisted. 
The government response was a security/ pacification campaign 
and, by mid-2018, more than 300 Bodi men were in prison. The 
huge influx of labourers to work on the dam construction or 
sugar plantations created a high demand for meat in the area, 
and the government constructed a livestock market, arguing that 
this would ensure good prices for Bodi livestock. However, the 
volume of sales was low and, critically, the Bodi characterised their 
market engagement mainly in terms of distress sales, linked to 
worsening food insecurity. Loss of land affected their traditional 
flood recession cropping, diseases were killing their livestock, men 
were in prison and so less labour was available, and insecurity was 
rife. Despite taking place from around 2011, these distress sales are 
comparable to those described among many other East African 
pastoralists since the 1940s. Although at the time of the research in 
2018 only two per cent of Bodi were described as destitute, and 55 
per cent were described as wealthy, a process of impoverishment 
across all wealth groups was evident.
Like the Bodi, the Tsemay in South Omo had been agro-pastoralists 
but they experienced a transformation of their livelihoods 
after central state expansion into their area began in the 1960s. 
Government programmes included road building, commercial 
farming, and sedenterisation campaigns. At the time of the 
APRA research, the Tsemay were far more settled and livestock 
marketing and monetisation of Tsemay livelihoods was already well-
established; sales of livestock to buy cereals and basic commodities 
were normal. For government officials, the market engagement 
and increasingly cash-based economy of the Tsemay was seen as 
evidence of their modernisation and development. However, in 
contrast to the Bodi, there was more marked wealth inequality 
among the Tsemay, with more destitute households (12 per cent) 
and fewer wealthy households (29 per cent). Furthermore, wealthier 
Tsemay had adapted their herds into two types: a herd for ‘breeding 
and herding’ and a herd for ‘the market’, and these owners were the 
main suppliers of livestock to the local markets.
Marketing behaviours and local vs.
long-distance trading 
In pastoralist systems, livestock are a productive asset, providing 
milk, meat, and blood, but are also the main form of financial 
savings. Production and marketing practices involve balancing 
production and savings objectives in a context where herd 
performance as a form of financial growth often exceeds 
opportunities for cash-based growth. These basic economic aspects 
of pastoralism largely explain why pastoralists tend to limit livestock 
sales to meet domestic needs such as food purchases, health care, 
or education. As livestock reproduce and herds grow, there is a 
clear economic logic to protecting and building financial capital 
rather than generating cash – for which there is limited use and few 
investment options (Barrett et al., 2006). Another reason for growing 
herds is to withstand drought. Although high livestock mortality 
due to drought affects herds of all sizes, poorer households with 
smaller herds are at more risk of losing animals to such an extent 
that prevents recovery. Wealthier households can also buy up the 
stock of poorer households during drought and more ably afford 
supplementary animal feed, if available. 
In general, wealthier households supply most of the livestock to 
markets. These households have larger herds which require more 
labour and expenditure, and lead to more livestock sales. These 
households are also able to coincide livestock sales to periods 
when prices are higher, and are able to buy animals from poorer 
households during stress periods. Wealthier households might also 
diversify into business or other activities, and they use livestock 
sales to fund these activities. For poorer households, the main 
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economic strategy is financial growth via herd growth. Livestock 
sales are minimised and tend not to be price responsive. 
These economic characteristics and risks of pastoralist livelihoods 
are repeatedly overlooked by policy makers or marketing experts, 
who usually assume that livestock off-take in pastoralist areas will 
always increase if more markets, abattoirs, or related facilities are 
constructed, thereby generating wealth for poorer pastoralists. Yet, 
this is not the case. As livestock are the main type of financial capital, 
sales by pastoralists will always be balanced against the need to 
maintain or build financial assets. Where market responsiveness 
occurs, it is usually among wealthier producers. National livestock 
marketing policies also emphasise support to export markets. 
However, the specific types and numbers of animals required by 
traders for these markets are far more easily sourced from wealthier 
pastoralists (Little et al., 2014), and analysis of the livestock export 
from East Africa clearly shows how benefits are captured by the 
owners of larger herds (Aklilu and Catley, 2009). There are also 
numerous accounts of wealthier producers adapting herd structures 
and splitting herds into a ‘traditional herd’ focusing on milk 
production and herd growth (financial capital), and a ‘market herd’ 
that is managed for livestock sales.
The question of which types of markets benefit which types of 
producers in pastoralist systems is explored in APRA research 
in Marsabit County, Kenya’s largest arid and semi-arid county 
(Roba, 2020). For many years, the physical isolation of Marsabit 
was reflected in the tarmac road from Nairobi to Moyale (on the 
Kenya-Ethiopia border) ending at Archer’s Post, just north of 
Isiolo. Not only was the dirt road between Marsabit and Moyale 
often impassable during heavy rain, but the route was notorious 
for banditry, and police escorts were often needed. This situation 
limited the livestock trade links between Marsabit and Nairobi’s 
main meat market in Dagoretti, as well as other major cities.
In 2008, the Kenyan government launched its long-term 
development programme, ‘Kenya Vision 2030’, which included 
a renewed commitment to a regional infrastructure project, the 
Lamu Port-South Sudan-Ethiopia-Transport (LAPSSET) Corridor 
Project. The project positioned Kenya as the gateway to regional 
markets, linking it directly to Ethiopia and South Sudan through 
the development of roads, railways, and other infrastructure. Under 
LAPSSET, a tarmac road from Archers Post to Moyale was finally 
completed in 2014, reducing the travel time between Moyale and 
Nairobi from about three days to 10 hours. The new road was 
associated with the emergence of new settlements and trading 
centers alongside it, as well as business expansion in Marsabit 
town and Moyale. As the APRA research shows, increasing trade 
in sheep and goats four years after the new road opened could be 
categorised as ‘short chains’ and ‘long chains’. Short chains were 
very localised livestock sales within ethnic boundaries and sub-
counties, involving actors of a specific ethnic group. Transactions 
in these chains relied heavily on social networks and kinship ties. 
In contrast, long chains covered the sale and trucking of animals 
to Kenya’s main cities, with some of these animals exported to the 
Middle East. The long chains involved far higher volumes of animals, 
and traders and transporters of various ethnic groups. This trade is 
supported by primary markets close to the grazing areas where the 
animals are reared, reducing trekking time and costs to the markets. 
Notably, the primary ‘markets’ do not necessarily involve a physical 
marketplace, but rather livestock sales at water points or in villages.
In general, wealthier and better organised pastoralist producers 
are suppliers to the long sheep and goats market chains. These 
chains carry both higher profits but also higher risks for local 
traders, as control over sales shifts to brokers and end-market 
clients. Short market chains seemed to carry lower prices but 
lower risks, partly because of the social network element of 
these chains. These chains have attracted increasing numbers 
of women traders; whereas women are less able to engage 
in long chain trade because it can require extended periods 
away from home. Another important development was the 
emergence of local livestock marketing groups. To some extent, 
these can allow poorer herders to pool their animals, increase 
their bargaining power, and better arrange the timing of sales to 
benefit from higher prices. Self-formed local groups in southern 
Marsabit performed better than groups that were established in 
response to non-government organisation (NGO) projects, with 
performance closely linked to group governance using traditional 
socio-cultural practices (Lotira et al., 2020). 
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Although the recent trend in livestock marketing in Marsabit County 
can be seen as a positive development, the APRA research also 
highlights a clear spatial variation across the county in terms of 
who benefits. The county is more than twice the size of Belgium, 
and most communities have limited access to the new highway, so 
continue to have limited access to markets and services. 
The politics of livestock trade
The huge value of livestock trade in East Africa means that control of 
the trade and capturing benefits, such as domestic taxes or foreign 
currency earnings, are matters of national politics, economies, 
and pride. The trade also affects political relationships between 
countries, as exemplified in the export of livestock from northern 
Somali ports and Djibouti. On the export side, the trade involves 
four states – Djibouti, Ethiopia, Puntland, and Somaliland – and is 
complicated by issues such as Ethiopia’s land-locked position and 
dependency on ports, and a substantial informal cross-border 
livestock trade from Ethiopia towards the ports (Eid, 2014). Whereas 
Ethiopia regards these animals as Ethiopian and so subject to 
Ethiopian control and taxation, production is mainly by Somali 
pastoralists in Ethiopia’s Somali Region, who have strong ethnic and 
trading ties with Somalis across a lengthy and often remote border. 
As each state seeks to benefit from the trade, the wider formal 
policy context is regional economic integration which, theoretically, 
supports the free movement of goods, services, and people. In the 
case of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development, economic 
integration of its Member States is both an end in itself and a way to 
support regional peace and political stability.
Since the early 1970s, policies and project proposals have lamented 
the irrational production and marketing behaviours of pastoralists, 
and supported livestock marketing as a strategy for area-wide 
poverty reduction. As a result, these areas have seen waves of 
market infrastructure development but with very limited evidence 
to show that new markets have positive impacts on poverty. As 
outlined above, there are clear economic reasons why pastoralists 
respond to market demands to some extent, while also limiting 
sales of their livestock. Poorer pastoralists in particular tend not to 
be price responsive. Indeed, if livestock prices increase relative to 
cereal prices, then pastoralists can sell fewer animals to meet their 
domestic food needs.
One result of the persistent misunderstandings about selling 
behaviour is that many pastoralist areas are littered with derelict 
markets, holding grounds, and abattoirs. While livestock markets are 
critical to pastoral livelihoods, these markets don’t require modern 
infrastructure to make them function. For example, as Somali 
livestock exports boomed in the 1970s, ‘The basic requirements, so 
far as market facilities are concerned, appear to be ample space for 
transactions and the provision of drinking water for market users. Little 
justification for investment in fencing, pens, scales or auction rings 
can be established since the system appears to work well in its present 
simple, highly flexible form’ (Reusse, 1982). Yet, this simplicity seems 
to offend marketing experts within aid donors and governments, 
who continue to call for commercialisation based on better market 
infrastructure. From 2005–2008, 25 new livestock markets were 
constructed in pastoralist regions of Ethiopia in yet another attempt 
to commercialise pastoralism (which was already commercialising). A 
project evaluation included visits to 18 of the new markets, but only 
nine were functioning and only 27% of the ‘modern’ facilities were 
being used (PLI Policy Project, 2010). In some cases, new markets 
were constructed at the site of pre-existing bush markets, but sellers 
and traders continued to operate in the bush markets to avoid 
taxes and market fees. In other cases, the poor placement of new 
markets sparked local violent conflicts which remained unresolved 
and led to them  being unused. This evaluation also questioned the 
quality of market construction, hinting at the substantial profits to 
be gained by contractors and their supporters in contexts of weak 
contracting procedures and supervision. For bush markets, the 
only improvement required was basic loading ramps to ease the 
movement of animals onto trucks.
Following devolution in Kenya in 2010, political pronouncements 
on the need to commercialise pastoralism and respond to market 
demands shifted from national to county-level, and pastoralist 
counties across northern Kenya were awash with plans not only to 
build new markets and abattoirs, but also airstrips for the export 
of chilled meat. In Garissa, Isiolo, Mandera, Marsabit, and Wajir, the 
local county government budgets for these projects amounted to 
over US$40 million, excluding contributions to market and abattoir 
construction from aid projects (Mahmoud, 2016). Yet, detailed or 
plausible feasibility studies or business plans were often elusive in 
both government and aid projects, and typically these initiatives 
were based on vague promises of accessing export markets 
and reducing poverty. While these new facilities allowed photo 
opportunities for local politicians and aid organisations, their long-
term management and relevance was very uncertain.
From the APRA case studies, it is clear that state-led infrastructure 
projects in pastoralist areas reflect high-level political ambitions 
and programmes, with objectives that are framed around regional 
or national development. The impacts of these programmes mirror 
early state expansion into drylands from the 1920s. In some cases, 
large-scale infrastructure or commercial agriculture displaced 
pastoralists – sometimes forcibly - with no or minimal compensation 
and few options for alternative livelihoods. For example, in the 1960s, 
the establishment of irrigated sugar plantations in the Awash Valley 
of Ethiopia directly contributed to a decline in Karrayu and Afar 
pastoralist systems as key grazing and water resources were lost, 
and migrant workers were employed on the new scheme. With this 
history, the impacts of the Gibe III dam development in South Omo 
from the mid-2000s are somewhat predictable in terms of outcomes 
for pastoralists such as the Bodi. 
Conclusions
Livestock commercialisation has been a reality in many pastoralist 
areas for decades, but the economic, social, and environmental 
features of pastoralism mean the benefits of commercialisation 
are captured by wealthier households, and that livestock sales are 
balanced against the need to maintain or grow herds for financial 
capital. Although commercialisation is promoted as universally 
beneficial by policies and aid programmes, in pastoralist systems, it 
is an important driver of increasing wealth stratification. Livestock 
commercialisation works for those with large enough herds – the 
relatively wealthy – and can create new jobs in herding, market 
yards, fodder production, and other livestock-related work. But most 
households in East Africa’s pastoralist areas have too few animals 
to commercialise and are ‘livestock poor and cash poor’. Over time, 
wealthier herd owners have capacity to appropriate key grazing 
and water resources, adapt herd management to both maintain 
a traditional herd and rear for the market, and are better able to 
manage the impacts of drought.
Many poorer pastoralist households face an uncertain future, and 
it is for these households that policy and programming support is 
most needed. The economic strategy preferred by these households 
is herd growth as a means to build financial assets. Rather than 
livestock markets, the priorities are secure access to pasture and 
water, and reducing mortality through better drought management 
and veterinary care. Market access is important, but basic roads and 
communications are the main types of infrastructure needed.
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